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Using a matched sample of franchisee and franchisor data, we identify through hierarchical 
linear modeling (HLM) that entrepreneurial characteristics of franchisees partially impact on 
their opportunistic tendencies. Further, relational contracting increases franchisee opportunism 
by strengthening the opportunism-enhancing impact of entrepreneurial characteristics. These 
findings point to a key dilemma franchisors need to be aware of: Entrepreneurially minded 
franchisees who might be better at exploiting market opportunities for their units may also 
behave more opportunistically, if given the chance through a more relational contracting 
regime. At the same time, if they perceive the contractual framework as being too rigid, they may 
be less able to leverage their capabilities, become dissatisfied and exit the system.  
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Introduction 
The choice of organizational governance form is a key strategic management decision as it 
has long-term implications on firm performance (Mitsuhashi, Shane, and Sine 2008; Sorenson 
and Sorensen 2001). A leading perspective in governance form choice is transaction cost 
economics (TCE), which holds that organizations will handle transactions to minimize the costs 
involved in carrying them out (Williamson 1985, 1991, 2010). Increasingly, organizations turn to 
hybrid forms of governance to have greater control than in market exchange, and to avoid 
disadvantages associated with vertical integration (Norton 1988; Powell 1990; Yin and Zajac 
2004).  
In particular, franchising as a hybrid governance model has gained increased economic 
importance and research attention over the last three decades (e.g., Blut et al. 2011; 
Castrogiovanni, Combs, and Justis 2006; Hunt 1977; Kaufmann and Dant 1999; Kaufmann and 
Rangan 1990; Kidwell and Nygaard 2011; Nair, Tikoo, and Liu 2009; Tracey and Jarvis 2007; 
Windsperger and Dant 2006). Franchising is particularly common in sectors where organizations 
need to operate through diffused distribution networks with outlets that are located close to 
customers and managed by individuals with local knowledge (Berg and Friedman 1980; Blair 
and Lafontaine 2005; Carney and Gedajlovic 1991).  
The benefits of franchising in comparison to other channel relationships are rooted in the 
unique combination of two functional principles: On the one hand, integrating a network of 
outlets under one brand and unified operational policies allows for capitalizing on economies of 
scale (Shane 1996). On the other hand, successful franchising depends on autonomously acting 
franchisees able to adapt to local market conditions and capitalize on the benefits of 
entrepreneurial engagement at a micro-system level (Sorenson and Sorensen 2001). Certainly, 
2 
 
other hybrid forms of organization such as cooperative purchasing groups or licensing 
agreements might possess similar advantages; yet, franchising is probably the most visible 
hybrid form of governance and hence the focus of this paper. 
Given the apparent tension between the two aforementioned functional principles, franchise 
relationships are fragile and in need of balancing standardization and adaptation (Sorenson and 
Sorensen 2001) as well as autonomy and dependence (Dant and Gundlach 1999). To find that 
balance, franchising crucially depends on both, the proper selection (ex-ante) as well as the 
management of franchisees (ex-post) (Jambulingam and Nevin 1999; Michael and Combs 2008).  
However, two key assumptions of TCE, bounded rationality and opportunism, advocate a 
focus on the contracting of partners. As a consequence, research has in the main focused on 
appropriate contracting so as to minimize levels of opportunism and related transaction costs 
(e.g., Mitsuhashi, Shane, and Sine 2008; Sorenson and Sorensen 2001; Yin and Zajac 2004).  
While the limitations of formal contracting have been well established in the literature (e.g., 
Aulakh and Gençtürk 2007; Poppo and Zenger 2002; Tirole 1999), less is known about the 
conditions under which relational contracting is an effective way of safeguarding against 
negative outcomes such as opportunism. This is important, though, as there is evidence that this 
form of contracting is being increasingly used in franchise systems to confront problems with 
agents (Cochet, Dormann, and Ehrmann 2008).  
Neoclassical contract theory suggests that formal and more extensive contracting efforts help 
to safeguard against opportunism (Luo 2002). The reason for this is that formal contracts 
explicitly state how members should behave, which leaves little room for interpretation of the 
rules outlined in the contract (Lusch and Brown 1996). As a result, sanctioning against 
misconduct is relatively straight forward.  
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In contrast, sociological approaches to contracting emphasize to a greater extent relational 
forms of contracting (Carson, Madhok and Wu 2006). Relational contracting incorporates the use 
of “unwritten codes of conduct” (Davies et al. 2011, p. 325) to safeguard against negative 
relationship outcomes (Cochet, Dormann, and Ehrmann 2008). In this type of contracting 
implicit, “relational norms that govern acceptable behavior between exchange partners” (Lusch 
and Brown 1996, p. 19) are developed over time and are based on social consensus or mutual 
understanding. Thus, relational contracting is long-term-oriented, reciprocal, and extends beyond 
mere buying and selling (Li and Dant 1997), as it forms the basis for the development of shared, 
long-term relational norms and behaviors between partners. Within a given franchise system, 
franchisors generally exercise the same level of relational contracting. Differences in levels of 
relational contracting are more based on perceptions of franchisees than on franchisor conduct.  
The key relational norms and behaviors that have been widely acknowledged in the literature 
are flexibility, information exchange, and collegiate problem-solving (Heide and John 1992; 
Kaufmann and Stern 1988; Poppo and Zenger 2002). As these norms develop in franchising 
contexts between franchisees and their franchisor over time, relational contracting can be 
regarded as a system level behavioral variable, which is likely to differ across systems, rather 
than a channel design variable (Hoetker and Mellewigt 2009). As such, in relational contracting 
social forces may create barriers to opportunistic behavior and foster cooperation (Carson, 
Madhok and Wu 2006). For these reasons it has been argued that relational contracting may 
create economic value (Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000).  
It has been acknowledged that the two described types of contracting, formal and relational, 
often coexist in organizational environments, i.e. they are not mutually exclusive (Lusch and 
Brown 1996). The extent to which one or the other is used depends on the situation and the 
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assessment as to what type of contracting is more efficient, i.e. which one can better safeguard 
against opportunism in a given business context (Carson, Madhok and Wu 2006). 
Although some studies suggest that relational contracting is efficient (Birkeland 2002; Lado, 
Dant, and Tekleab 2008), there is also evidence that its efficiency is dependent on organizational 
governance form, and in particular the level of ambiguity pertinent within organizations. 
Ambiguity (e.g., Sillince, Jarzabkowski and Shaw 2010) refers to the possibility that an 
interpretation of a situation, information or role is doubtful or uncertain. The pertinence of 
ambiguity in principal-agent relationships, as can be found in hybrid governance forms such as 
franchising, has been well acknowledged in the literature (Kashyap, Antia and Frazier 2012). In 
the main, ambiguity can be observed in the form of franchisee role ambiguity, for example in 
relation to what functions or responsibilities the franchisee needs to fulfill in a franchise system.  
Agency theory highlights the issues that arise with the principal (franchisor) employing an 
agent (franchisee). According to agency theory, complete formal contracts can be formulated in 
order to control agent actions. However, TCE assumes that such contracts are necessarily 
incomplete (e.g., Williamson 1975, 1985), which in turn gives room for interpretation, for 
example in relation to the functions and responsibilities of the franchisee. This, by definition, 
means that ambiguity is higher in franchising contexts with principal and agent relationships than 
in hierarchy, as company-owned units are under stronger, explicit control and have fewer 
possibilities for own decision-making (Yin and Zajac 2004). 
Further, based on the extant literature, there is also reason to suggest that agent motivation can 
impact on the safeguarding effects of relational contracting in franchising: From an agency 
theory perspective (Eisenhardt 1989; Gillis et al. 2011), franchisors (principals) have to consider 
the motivations of the individual franchisee (agent) before determining contractual arrangements 
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(Michael and Combs 2008). However, little research has been carried out to investigate the 
combined effects of contracting and agent motivation on opportunism.  
Franchisees are frequently referred to as legally independent, small scale entrepreneurs 
(Cochet and Garg 2008). While there is some debate as to whether franchisees actually are 
entrepreneurs (Ketchen, Short, and Combs 2011) and possess entrepreneurial characteristics 
(Birkeland 2002), there is growing support for the notion (Cochet, Dormann, and Ehrmann 2008; 
Kaufmann and Dant 1999), whether they are in single-unit or sequential multi-unit agreements 
(Ketchen, Short, and Combs 2011; Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt 2005).  
Here exactly lies the franchising dilemma which is the focus of our study: On the one hand, 
entrepreneurial characteristics and motivations are desirable as they are related to the 
identification and exploitation of market opportunities for the system. To fully leverage the 
entrepreneurial capital franchisees bring into the system, franchisors might need to grant a 
certain level of autonomy (Kaufman and Eroglu 1999; Schul, Little, and Pride 1985; Strutton, 
Pelton, and Lumpkin 1995). On the other hand, there is reason to suggest that entrepreneurial 
characteristics in combination with greater autonomy may be related to higher levels of 
opportunism and thus increased transaction costs for the franchisor (e.g., Cochet, Dormann, and 
Ehrmann 2008).  
As little research exists concerning the dilemma we described, we will first investigate how 
key entrepreneurial characteristics – innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness (Miller 1983; 
Covin and Slevin 1986, 1989) – influence opportunistic tendencies of franchisees. Thus, in this 
study we consider these entrepreneurial characteristics at an individual franchisee level.  
Secondly, in order to understand the extent to which relational contracting, a franchise system 
level variable, may or may not safeguard franchisors against agency problems in these industries, 
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we assess its moderating role on the link between franchisees’ propensity to favor innovation, 
take risks, being proactive, and opportunism in franchisee-franchisor dyads. As mentioned 
above, this is particularly important as there is evidence that relational contracting is increasingly 
adopted as a management strategy in franchising systems (Cochet, Dormann, and Ehrmann 
2008).  
Addressing this research agenda we add to the extant literature by highlighting some 
important issues that need to be considered by franchisors ex-ante in the selection, as well as ex-
post in the management of franchisees. 
 
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
The Franchisee-Entrepreneur Performance Dilemma 
One of the main arguments for the adoption of franchising as a hybrid governance form 
advanced in the literature is the problem of agent motivation (Price 1997). Due to the 
geographically dispersed nature of franchise systems it is difficult to oversee the actions of outlet 
managers. Thus, in order to reduce transaction costs associated with safeguarding against 
negative business outcomes, franchising is viewed as a favorable option. The commonly held 
view is that franchisees as owners of their outlets are more motivated to act in the interest of the 
business than employed managers (Castrogiovanni, Combs, and Justis 2006; Michael and Combs 
2008).  
Contrary to the opinion of some, franchising is often described as an entrepreneurial activity 
(Cochet and Garg 2008). Birkeland (2002) highlights that franchise systems do not hamper 
entrepreneurial motivations of their franchisees and that most franchise operations are small and 
run like family businesses. In line with this, many authors suggest that franchisees are 
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entrepreneurs and possess entrepreneurial characteristics (Grünhagen and Mittelstaedt 2005; 
Kaufman and Dant 1999). Similarly, Birkeland (2002) states that franchisees think of themselves 
as entrepreneurs as they own their franchise unit.  
Specifically, in a recent paper, Ketchen, Short, and Combs (2011) provide an in-depth 
discussion of the question of whether franchisees can be regarded as entrepreneurs. The authors 
provide compelling empirical evidence that franchisees possess entrepreneurial motivations 
(Ketchen, Short, and Combs 2011) which are linked to positive business outcomes. In sum, the 
idea that franchisees’ entrepreneurial capacities are desirable and may contribute to system 
success is relatively uncontested.  
The current state of research provides strong support for three key entrepreneurial 
characteristics: innovativeness, risk taking and proactiveness (Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos 
2009; Carland et al. 1984; Covin and Slevin 1986, 1989; Delmar and Davidsson 2000; George 
and Marino 2011; Kaufmann and Dant 1999; Korunka et al. 2003; Miller 1983). These have 
been defined by Lumpkin and Dess (2001, p. 431) as follows: 
Innovativeness refers to “a willingness to support creativity and experimentation in 
introducing new products/services, and novelty, technological leadership and R&D in developing 
new processes.” While innovativeness is positively linked to openness to new experience, its 
downside is its negative association with agreeableness and conscientiousness.  It is more likely 
that such individuals engage in “breaking rules” and have a greater propensity to act 
opportunistically (George and Zhou 2001; Runco 2004). Risk taking has been defined as a 
“tendency to take bold actions such as venturing into unknown new markets, committing a large 
portion of resources to ventures with uncertain outcomes, and/or borrowing heavily” (Lumpkin 
and Dess 2001, p. 431). If someone is more prone to risk taking then they are more likely to take 
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a gamble that they are not going to get caught when disregarding rules or norms. Thus, the risk 
of acting opportunistically increases (Jambulingam and Nevin 1999). Proactiveness represents an 
“opportunity-seeking, forward-looking perspective involving introducing new products or 
services ahead of the competition and acting in anticipation of future demand to create change 
and shape the environment” Lumpkin and Dess 2001, p. 431). As proactiveness deals with 
competitiveness and getting ahead of competition, opportunistic behavior is more likely as 
“cutting corners” seems acceptable (Kickul and Gundry 2002). 
Given that the above characteristics are not necessarily strongly related to each other 
(Lumpkin and Dess 2001), we look at each of them separately instead of integrating them into a 
higher order construct, “entrepreneurial orientation” (e.g., Covin and Wales 2012; Wiklund 
1999). This is in response to the suggestion from the literature stating that future research in this 
domain may benefit from such an approach, instead of looking at entrepreneurial orientation as 
an aggregate concept (Kreiser, Marino, and Weaver 2002; Lumpkin and Dess 1996). 
Literature investigating consequences of entrepreneurial motivations has linked the construct 
to performance outcomes (Li, Huang, and Tsai 2009; Wiklund 1999). Consequently, also in the 
context of franchising, one could assume that entrepreneurial characteristics of franchisees drive 
their individual franchisee performance. However, there are also arguments for the notion that 
entrepreneurial characteristics of franchisees may, in fact, have a negative impact on franchise 
system performance: All three entrepreneurial characteristics under investigation – namely, 
innovativeness, business risk-taking, and proactiveness (Marino et al., 2002; Morris and Sexton 
1996; Wiklund and Shepherd 2005) – are related to lower levels of agreeableness in work 
settings, higher tolerance to friction and a stronger urge for autonomy (Birkeland 2002; 
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Caliendo, Fossen, and Kritikos, 2009; Eysenck 1976; George and Zhou 2001; Jambulingam and 
Nevin 1999; Kickul and Gundry 2002; Lumpkin, Cogliser, and Schneider 2008; Runco 2004). 
Concerning innovativeness, it can be argued that this characteristic should enhance the desire 
for work settings that allow for personal fulfillment and the freedom to move forward with one’s 
own ideas without any constraints imposed by the franchisor. As an entrepreneurial 
characteristic, innovativeness should thus correspond with an increased interest to implement 
own ideas in order to positively influence own store performance (Combs, Michael, and 
Castrogiovanni 2004; Bradach 1997; Kaufmann and Eroglu 1999). Given that, at least to some 
extent, franchise systems naturally restrict personal initiatives and freedom to realize innovative 
ideas, it can be assumed that innovativeness does not necessarily correspond with cooperative 
behavior, but may instead foster opportunistic tendencies. Franchisees with higher levels of risk-
taking are more prone to “challenge the way business is conducted” (Jambulingam and Nevin 
1999) by their franchisor. In such cases there may be a greater propensity to engage in divergent 
activities in order to enhance the performance of own units. This behavior could be further 
encouraged by the fact that high risk-taking franchisees feel less threatened by the risk that their 
deviance may be uncovered. Proactiveness, similarly, may increase opportunistic tendencies, as 
this entrepreneurial characteristic is related to searching for opportunities to transform and 
develop one’s own business (Kickul and Gundry, 2002). The interest of the entire system may 
not necessarily be at the forefront of business activity considerations of franchisees that are 
highly proactive. 
On this basis, individuals who possess high levels of innovativeness, risk-taking, and 
proactiveness may be successful entrepreneurs, but may simultaneously be less suited for 
franchise system environments. In particular, the bilateral dependency on which such hybrid 
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forms of governance are built (David and Han 2004; Williamson 1991) is in opposition to the 
very nature of these entrepreneurial characteristics. Therefore, we propose that such individuals 
are more likely to cope with internal conflicts and therefore pursue their own personal objectives 
in an opportunistic manner, which can negatively impact the overall success of the system 
(Cochet, Dormann, and Ehrmann 2008; Mitsuhashi, Shane, and Sine 2008; Sorenson and 
Sorensen 2001; Yin and Zajac 2004).  
Thus, from a franchisor perspective, a dilemma evolves in which the trade-off between 
potential benefits and hazards of franchisees’ entrepreneurial characteristics needs to be 
considered. Given the managerial importance of these considerations, as they concern ex-ante 
selection as well as ex-post management practices, it is important to assess empirically the link 
between individual franchisees’ entrepreneurial characteristics and their levels of opportunism. 
Based on the above discussed literature, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a):  Franchisees’ levels of innovativeness are positively related to levels of 
opportunism. 
Hypothesis 1b (H1b):  Franchisees’ levels of proactiveness are positively related to levels of 
opportunism. 
Hypothesis 1c (H1c):  Franchisees’ levels of risk-taking are positively related to levels of 
opportunism. 
 
The Moderating Effects of Relational Contracting 
The few studies that have explored the link between franchisees’ characteristics and franchise 
system outcomes have not taken contextual moderators, such as governance form or type of 
contracting, into account (Jambulingam and Nevin 1999). However, research suggests that the 
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link between personal characteristics and behavior is moderated by a person’s beliefs as to 
whether it is easy or difficult to perform an act (Ajzen 1991; Krueger and Carsrud 1993). These 
perceptions, of whether it is easy or difficult to behave in a particular way, depend on past 
experiences as well as current obstacles to, or opportunities for, the performance of a behavior.  
The above observations provide a parallel to TCE and agency theory which both highlight the 
need for contracting, as otherwise partners or agents will behave in their own interest (Eisenhardt 
1989; Williamson 1975). Applied to the franchise context, we argue that ex-post contracting 
moderates the link between the above discussed entrepreneurial characteristics of franchisees and 
their levels of opportunism.  
Research in TCE and agency theory has traditionally focused on organizational management 
through formal contracting. This is because in the presence of opportunism and self-interest 
organizations have to deal with goal divergence between contracting parties. It is important to 
note, though, that TCE and agency theory have differing underlying assumptions: TCE assumes 
bounded rationality, suggesting that organizations possess only limited foresight and cannot 
protect themselves against all eventualities, whereas agency theory suggests that all 
contingencies can be specified ex-ante (David and Han 2004; Eisenhardt 1989; Kim and 
Mahoney 2005; Mitsuhashi, Shane, and Sine 2008).  
Understanding the efficiency of contracts and different contracting mechanisms, i.e. the extent 
to which potential opportunistic behavior can be suppressed, is particularly important in 
franchise system contexts, due to the nature of franchising as a business model. Features such as 
a dominant entrepreneurial ideology and geographical dispersion lead to opportunities for 
franchisees to operate units in a self-interested manner that may damage the system in the long 
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run (Birkeland 2002). It is for this reason that formal contracting as a control mechanism has 
been widely discussed in the franchising literature. 
A different stream of the literature has advanced the relational contracting approach (Lado, 
Dant, and Tekleab 2008; Koza and Dant 2007; Macneil 1980), a form of contracting which is 
increasingly used in practice (Cochet, Dormann, and Ehrmann 2008). In contrast to TCE and 
agency theory, relationalism embeds exchange into a social context. Some of the key exchange 
characteristics between partners in relational contracting involve flexibility, information 
exchange, and collegiate problem-solving (Heide and John 1992; Kaufmann and Stern 1988).  
Proponents of relational contracting suggest that it creates economic value through the 
development of unwritten shared norms, values, and behaviors that safeguard against conflict 
(Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000). A further advantage may be that this approach is more flexible 
than formal contracting and can thus be adjusted for the management of different franchisees that 
come from a wide range of backgrounds and experiences, and as such have varying aspirations 
and expectations for their units (Birkeland 2002). Moreover, relational contracting may foster 
autonomy and thus entrepreneurial initiative. Thus, it might aid in the realization of decentralized 
decision-making, whereas a formal contracting approach could be perceived as providing too 
narrow a framework for franchisees.  
However, herein may also exactly lie a limitation of relational contracting. Referring back to 
the franchisee-entrepreneur performance dilemma, we point to evidence which suggests that 
relational contracting may not be robust across all governance forms. This may be particularly 
the case in governance forms that are higher in ambiguity than hierarchy, such as franchising 
(Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 2012). In such contexts, where the principal needs to clearly 
establish the functions and responsibilities of the agent, relational contracting may be less likely 
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to safeguard against opportunism (Carson, Madhok, and Wu 2006). The reason is that relational 
contracting further increases ambiguity due to the fact that it gives franchisees more autonomy 
within a framework of rules that are not explicitly stated, as they would be in formal contracting. 
Therefore, relational contracting through its ambiguity-enhancing properties may moderate the 
links between entrepreneurial characteristics and opportunistic behavior.
1
  
Autonomy is “the extent to which a party, here a franchisee, is unconstrained to independently 
make decisions and to take action” (Cochet, Dormann, Ehrmann 2008, p. 52). In contrast to 
formal contracting, relational contracting relies on a set of unwritten rules (e.g., Lado, Dant and 
Tekleab 2008). This means that in comparison to formal contracting, under relational contracting 
there is greater ambiguity, a term which refers to the possibility that various interpretations of a 
situation, information or role are possible which makes them thus doubtful or uncertain. The 
reason for this is that with unwritten rules, standards are more open to interpretation, more 
difficult to be reinforced (Carson, Madhok and Wu, 2006) and give thus more leeway in 
decision-making, which in turn means greater autonomy. While relational contracting 
mechanisms, such as information exchange, may be reinforced to ensure franchisee 
collaboration, these mechanisms are by definition less formalized than those deployed under 
formal contracting and thus provide greater room for autonomy.  
Based on the above it can be argued that the link between ambiguity and opportunism has 
been relatively well established. However, while it has been suggested that relational contracting 
cannot perfectly enforce cooperative behavior and may thus only provide a partial safeguard to 
agency costs ex-post (such as costs incurred through opportunistic behavior) (e.g., Jap and 
                                                          
1
  It is worth noting that it is beyond the scope of this paper to assess in more detail the mediating role of 
ambiguity; here, we are concerned with the moderating effect of relational contracting. However, future research 
should investigate the role of ambiguity to gain further insights into the mechanisms of how relational 
contracting impacts on the entrepreneurial characteristics-opportunism link.  
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Ganesan 2000), as sanctioning is more difficult, if not impossible, only very few studies have in 
fact investigated to what extent the level of relational contracting may moderate the link between 
franchisee characteristics (here entrepreneurial characteristics) and franchisee behavior (here 
opportunistic behavior). It is for this reason that our study focuses on the constructs relational 
contracting, franchisee characteristics and opportunism. This is particularly important as 
franchisees, who possess high levels of entrepreneurial motivations, might more actively engage 
in opportunistic behaviors under stronger relational contracting, as it is difficult for the franchisor 
to observe, control or sanction such behaviors. Especially, we argue that innovativeness, 
proactiveness, and risk-taking help to explain franchisees’ opportunistic behaviors in case of 
highly relational governance regimes.  
If a franchisee possesses high levels of these three characteristics, they might show a higher 
probability of engaging in self-interest seeking behaviors which – from the perspective of the 
franchise system as a whole – are not beneficial, if they are given the opportunity to do so 
without being observed or sanctioned. On the other hand, franchisees with lower levels of the 
three entrepreneurial characteristics will possibly be less inclined to opportunistically exploit 
their freedom. Therefore, we suggest that relational contracting strengthens the opportunism-
enhancing effects of innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk-taking. Hence: 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a):  Relational contracting moderates the link between franchisees’ 
innovativeness and opportunism in that it strengthens the positive link 
between the two constructs. 
Hypothesis 2b (H2b): Relational contracting moderates the link between franchisees’ 
proactiveness and opportunism in that it strengthens the positive link 
between the two constructs. 
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Hypothesis 2c (H2c):  Relational contracting moderates the link between franchisees’ risk-taking 
and opportunism in that it strengthens the positive link between the two 
constructs. 
 
Conceptual Model 
In summary, the arguments advanced above leading to H1a-c suggest that opportunism (OPP) 
is increased at the individual franchisee-level (level 1) by three entrepreneurial characteristics. 
More precisely, we assume that innovativeness (INNO), proactiveness (PRO), and business risk-
taking (RISK) are positively related to opportunism. In addition to the three entrepreneurial 
characteristics, we control for the effect of the time a franchisee has been with the system 
(FR_AGE), as it has been suggested that over time more agency conflicts may evolve in a 
relationship (Cochet, Dormann, and Ehrmann 2008).  
Turning to system level effects (level 2), and in line with H2a-c, we assume moderating 
effects on the franchise system-level (level 2) such that relational contracting (REC) strengthens 
the opportunism-enhancing impact of the three entrepreneurial characteristics – innovativeness, 
proactiveness, and business risk-taking. In addition to investigating the moderating impact of 
relational contracting as our key construct of interest and in order to avoid model 
misspecification, we control for the age of the franchise system (AGE_SYS) and the number of 
franchisees (NO_FR). The rational is that franchise system age and the number of franchisees are 
proxies for franchisor experience which could have an impact on the average opportunism level 
in a given system (Dant and Gundlach 1999; Lilis, Narayana, and Gilman 1976). We also include 
average success of the system (SUCC), as there is evidence that performance plays a 
predominant role in determining partner opportunism (Deeds and Hill 1998). 
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A simplified conceptual model is illustrated in Figure 1. 
----------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------- 
As we have matched data, namely franchisee level data and franchise system level data, 
whereby the franchisee data is nested in the franchise system data, we use hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM) for the analysis (Hox 1995; Muthen and Satorra 1995; Raudenbush and Bryk 
2002; Snijders and Bosker 1999). HLM is well suited for our research objectives as it allows for 
a simultaneous investigation of level 1 drivers of opportunism and level 2 moderators in a single 
model. The final model looks as follows:  
Level 1 opportunism-model 
(1) rPRORISKINNOOPP  )()()( 3210   
 
Level 2 opportunism-model 
Intercept effects 
2) 0030201000 )()_()_( uSUCCFRNOSYSAGE    
 
Slope effects 
3) 111101 )( uREC    
4) 221202 )( uREC    
5) 331303 )( uREC    
 
Method 
Data Collection  
We first compiled a list of 153 franchise systems operating in Germany. This list only 
contains systems that are organized in the German Franchise Association and that have had at 
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least five franchisees for the last two years. We asked the franchisors for their support by 
providing a list of their franchisees for us to survey. 22 systems offered their support. The final 
sampling list contains a total of 2,530 franchisees across the 22 systems. It is also worth 
mentioning that all cases from the franchisee data can be matched to a particular franchise 
system, enabling a multi-level analysis.  
Data for our study were collected through standardized questionnaires. 321 usable 
questionnaires were returned which equates a response rate of 12.3 percent. With regard to 
system size, the majority (64 percent) of systems consist of a maximum of 100 franchisees, 36 
percent are between 101 and 500 franchisees (mean = 115) with a system-wide turnover of 187 
Mio Euros (S.D. = 57 Mio). On average, franchisees belong to systems that have been on the 
market for 25 years (S.D. = 9.06). Moreover, the majority of franchisees (67.3 percent) are from 
the service and retail sector and can be considered small business operations. Table 1 provides a 
detailed breakdown of the sample
2
. 
----------------------------- 
Table1 about here 
----------------------------- 
Apart from the primary data collected from the franchisees, we also gathered secondary data 
on the franchise systems, using the franchise systems’ websites, objective information provided 
by the franchisor, various franchise handbooks, annual reports, reports from the national 
franchise associations, and other publically available sources.  
                                                          
2
  While not claiming representativeness, our sample seems to be a good representation of the overall franchise 
market in Germany: 52.3 percent services industries (41.2 percent in Germany); 26.8 percent retailing (22.5 
percent); 7.5 percent hotel and fast-food industries (13.5 percent); 7.8 percent handcraft and construction 
services (7.3 percent); 0 percent fitness and health industries (5.4 percent); 5.6 percent tourism industries (4.1 
percent); and 0 percent others industries (6 percent). 
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Measures 
Level 1 measures. In the survey, we measure each franchisee’s entrepreneurial characteristics 
(innovativeness (INNO), proactiveness (PRO), and business risk-taking (RISK)) (Covin and 
Slevin 1986, 1989; Jambulingam and Nevin 1999; Lumpkin, Cogliser, and Schneider 2009; 
Miller 1983). The analysis suggests that all measures are valid and reliable. Particularly, 
discriminant validity is given since correlations are generally rather low and none of the squared 
correlations between pairs of constructs exceed the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) of either 
construct (Fornell and Larcker 1981). We also measure opportunism (OPP; CR = .901; AVE = 
.787) with seven items suggested by Jambulingam and Nevin (1999)
3
.  
We also assess common method bias as level-1 items are from the same source. Using the 
procedure suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2003), we note that common method variance does not 
seem to be a severe issue in our data
4
.  
We calculate scale means of the three independent variables as well as the dependent variable 
for our HLM analysis. Apart from these level 1 measures, we also assess the years a franchisee 
has been a part of the system (AGE_FR).  
Level 2 measures. On the franchise system level, we use objective company data to assess the 
age of the franchise systems (AGE_SYS) and the number of franchisees in the system (NO_FR) 
as a measure for system size. Moreover, we use the relational contracting measures from the 
franchisee survey to aggregate them to the system level (as suggested by Kozlowski and Klein, 
2000). It is deemed suitable to aggregate level 1 data to level 2 as the intraclass correlation ICC 
(1) is larger than .2, the ICC (2) is larger than .7, and the mean Rwg(j) is larger than .8 (Bliese 
                                                          
3
  To further assess the quality of these measures, we run EFA and CFA and find no cross-loadings, but a good 
overall fit of the measurement model (chi-squared/DF = 1.976; AGFI = .932; TLI = .913; RMSEA = .042).  
4
  Details of these analyses are available upon request. 
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2000). We thereby calculate a system-wide measure of the degree of relational contracting (REC; 
CR = .897; AVE = 721), which is assessed using the key dimensions flexibility, information 
exchange, and collegiate problem-solving (Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000; Heide and John 1992; 
Jambulingam and Nevin 1999; Kaufmann and Stern 1988). Moreover, we measure perceptions 
of success of the franchise system (SUCC; CR = 901; AVE = .698). Discriminant validity is not 
an issue in our level 2 data as the variables are not significantly correlated. As before, we create 
scale means for all level 2 variables.  
Co-variables. At level 1, we include the age of the franchise system and the number of 
franchisees as measures of franchisor experience. Literature finds support for the notion that 
more experienced franchisors should be more advanced in terms of franchisee selection, 
incentive design and monitoring (Stump and Heide 1996). We also include system performance 
corresponding to the study of Deeds and Hill (1998), who found that alliance performance plays 
a predominant role in determining partner opportunism. The theoretical rationale for this effect is 
that underperforming partnerships usually go along with disappointment and friction in the 
relationship. Thereby, blame for failure is regularly allocated to the franchisor. Due to the high 
level of dependency of the franchisee, the probability of behaving opportunistically increases. 
Table 2 provides key psychometric properties of the level 1 and level 2 measures. For a 
complete overview of all the items used in the survey, please refer to the Appendix. 
----------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
----------------------------- 
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Analysis Overview 
As suggested by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), we employ hierarchical linear modeling 
(HLM) to analyze our data, as we have two levels of data, namely franchisee level data and 
franchise system level data, whereby the franchisee data is nested in the franchise system data. 
Hence, ordinary regression analysis would not be appropriate since such data violates the 
assumption of independence of observations (error-term correlation), a key premise of regression 
analysis (Hox 1995; Raudenbush et al. 2004; Snijders and Bosker 1999). Clearly, our franchisee 
data points are not independent, but nested in higher level groups, in our case the franchise 
system an individual franchisee belongs to.  
Along suggestions by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) as well as Muthen and Satorra (1995), we 
first of all assess if there is sufficient variation between the 22 franchise systems with respect to 
opportunism, our dependent variable. In order to do so, we calculate the design effect (DEFF) as 
an average class size adjusted intra-class correlation (ICC) as follows: 
 
))/(()1(1 222 WBBcDEFF    
 
with c being the average class size, 2B  the between-class correlation, and 
2
W  the within-class 
correlation. Muthen and Satorra (1995) suggest that whenever DEFF is larger than 2, there is 
sufficient reason to assume a severe violation of the assumption of independent observations 
across all classes, and propose that in such a case multilevel analysis should be employed. Our 
results show that the design effect for opportunism is DEFF = 8.44. Therefore, HLM is an 
appropriate technique to analyze our data.  
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Results 
Based on our conceptual model, we estimate a random intercept/random slope model. Table 3 
provides estimations of the unstandardized regression coefficients for all level 1 and level 2 
effects. 
----------------------------- 
Table3 about here 
----------------------------- 
We note that the three independent variables are very weakly correlated (Table 2) and when 
including all in a regression analysis, variance inflation factors (VIFs) are between 1.009 and 
1.308, sufficiently below the threshold suggested in the literature (Hair et al. 2006). Hence, 
multicollinearity is not an issue in our data. The results of our HLM model show that the 
independent variables, except innovativeness, significantly predict opportunism. More precisely, 
we find that a one-unit change in risk-taking leads to an increase in opportunism of .676 points 
(on the five-point opportunism scale); similarly, a one-unit increase in proactiveness results in a 
.180 point increase in opportunism.  
We also note that the co-variable franchisee age is negatively related to opportunism such that 
a one-unit increase in age leads to a .591 * 10
-3
 decrease in opportunism.  
Turning to the level 2 intercept effects of the three co-variables, we find that age and success 
of the franchise do not seem to be related to the average opportunism level in the system. We 
further note that the size of a franchise system (measured by the number of franchisees) is 
significantly, systematically, and positively related to average opportunism levels in a particular 
franchise system, possibly suggesting that larger systems are more prone to opportunistic 
behavior of their franchisees. 
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As for the key level 2 slope effects, we find some support for the assumption that relational 
contracting increases the positive (opportunism increasing) effects of innovativeness, 
proactiveness, and business risk-taking on opportunism. However, only the moderating effect on 
the link between business risk-taking and opportunism is significant at the .05-level, while the 
innovativeness-opportunism link is only significant at the .1-level
5
. The proactiveness-
opportunism link is moderated in the expected direction, yet, the effect is statistically non-
significant (t = .926; p > .1). Taken together, these findings provide only partial support for 
hypothesis 2
6
.  
 
Discussion and Implications 
Contribution to Theory 
Research grounded in TCE focuses on the efficiency of governance form and contracting to 
safeguard against opportunism (e.g., Mitsuhashi, Shane, and Sine 2008; Sorenson and Sorensen 
2001). Based on agency theoretical considerations (Eisenhardt 1989), we argue that also 
individual agent motivation needs to be taken into account in order to explain variance in 
opportunism. This research contributes to existing franchising research first of all by showing 
that franchisees’ entrepreneurial characteristics impact partially on opportunism (Castrogiovanni, 
Combs, and Justis 2006). This carries implications for the assessment and reduction of 
transaction costs ex-ante, for example through social mechanisms such as selective franchisee 
recruitment (Birkeland 2002).  
                                                          
5
  We are aware that the normal cut-off value for significance of effects is .05. However, considering the sample 
size at level 2 (n=22) and the t-value of 1.882, we argue that reporting the effect as non-significant might be 
unadvisable.  
6 
 The inclusion of an industry-dummy as a co-variable yielded a non-significant result for the dummy. 
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Specifically, looking at the results of our Hypotheses H1b and H1c, we note that 
proactiveness and risk-taking are important antecedents of franchisee opportunism (Jambulingam 
and Nevin 1999). The dimension franchisee innovativeness, however, did not show the positive 
relationship assumed in Hypothesis H1a. Therefore, it needs to be said that the relationship 
between innovativeness and opportunism may be less straightforward compared to the other two 
entrepreneurial characteristics under investigation here. Given that franchise systems vary to a 
large degree in terms of innovation management practices, the existence and direction of the 
relationship between innovativeness and opportunism might depend on the experience 
franchisees have made when trying to market innovative ideas at the system level. Franchisors 
who keep responsibilities for innovation development in their own realm of activities might in 
fact encounter problems such as intra-system inertia (Kaufmann and Eroglu 1999), less 
cooperation or an increased probability of opportunism with highly innovative franchisees. In 
franchise systems in which franchisees are actively encouraged to participate in innovation 
processes, however, the assumed relationship might not necessarily exist. Given that innovation 
activities are traditionally seen as the duty of the franchisor (Falbe, Dandridge and Kumar 1999), 
there is a point to be made here that the potential of innovative franchisees may be realized 
without the negative aspects of an increased level of opportunism. 
Empirically, the reason for the non-significant impact might be the fact that innovativeness 
has a rather low standard deviation. This suggests that innovativeness does not differ a great deal 
among franchisees. While this does not imply that innovativeness is not an important predictor of 
opportunism, it suggests that variation in innovativeness is unlikely to explain the variation in the 
opportunism construct.  
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Taken together, the results of hypotheses H1a-c show that it is useful to look at the three 
entrepreneurial characteristics separately, instead of aggregating them to one higher-order 
construct, entrepreneurial orientation, when investigating outcomes such as opportunism 
(Kreiser, Marino, and Weaver 2002; Lumpkin and Dess 1996). Thereby, our findings 
complement the results of a meta-analysis investigating the relationship between personality 
characteristics and entrepreneurial status (Zhao and Seibert 2006), which reveals that one of the 
Big Five personality traits, agreeableness, is negatively related to entrepreneurial status. Thus, 
according to the definition of agreeableness, entrepreneurs seem to be more strongly determined 
by self-interest, while being less altruistic, forgiving or gullible (Zhao and Seibert 2006). 
However, our results indicate that this may only hold for the entrepreneurial characteristics 
proactiveness and risk-taking, but not for innovativeness. 
In the case of franchising as a hybrid governance form, and using franchisees’ entrepreneurial 
characteristics and relational contracting as examples, we demonstrate how elements of ex-post 
contracting moderate the link between individual agent motivation and important outcomes. 
More precisely, our data show that relational contracting strengthens the link between risk-taking 
and opportunism, and (to a lesser degree) between innovativeness and opportunism. Put 
differently, we find that the opportunism-increasing effect of risk-taking is further increased by 
relational contracting, rendering this form of governance in a franchise context questionable. In 
addition, while innovativeness has not been identified as a direct antecedent of opportunism, it is 
important to be aware of its opportunism increasing effects when following a relational 
contracting approach. It should be mentioned that this finding does not suggest that the use of 
relational contracting is unsuitable for safeguarding against opportunism; however, it suggests 
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that there exists at least one boundary condition for relational contracting to protect against 
opportunistic behavior.  
This result contributes to the understanding of a key dilemma in franchising: While there is 
evidence that higher levels of autonomy – which can be fostered through relational contracting – 
are important to leverage the entrepreneurial capacities of franchisees (Kaufman and Eroglu 
1999; Schul, Little, and Pride 1985; Strutton, Pelton, and Lumpkin 1995), we demonstrate that at 
the same time this form of contracting encourages opportunistic behavior. The potential reason 
for this observation is that relational contracting – compared to hierarchical forms of governance 
– increases the already existing ambiguity in hybrid governance forms, such as franchise 
systems. The consequence is that it is not only more difficult to evaluate the actions of 
franchisees in the first place, but also to correctly interpret franchisees’ behaviors as compliant or 
opportunistic (Carson, Madhok, and Wu 2006). Therefore, the boundaries for the judgment of 
and sanctioning against opportunism may become more blurred. We have to note, however, that 
this is our interpretation of the effect and we do not have the necessary data to formally test the 
mediating role of ambiguity in the moderating effect of relational contracting. Further research 
should possibly consider doing this as a fruitful avenue for advancing our understanding of the 
functioning of relational contracting. 
As expected, franchisee age reduces opportunism, possibly through the fact that franchisee 
trust increases over time (after an initial drop; see: Blut et al. 2011), which likely reduces 
opportunism. Moreover, it can be argued that the longer a franchisee is part of a franchise 
system, the more the norms affect their behavior – thus leading to the inverse relationship 
between franchisee age and opportunism. 
Managerial Implications 
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The results of our study have several managerial implications. Given that proactiveness and 
risk-taking are at least partially linked to opportunism, franchisors should more fully consider 
how to select potential franchisees and assess future transaction costs ex-ante. For example, it is 
possible that individuals with higher levels of proactiveness and risk-taking may not necessarily 
drive franchise system performance. Instead, they may cause more ex-post transaction costs due 
to opportunistic behavior.  
Looking at the relative magnitude of the effects, risk-taking (H1c) can be identified as the 
variable that is – by far – most strongly related to opportunism. Thus, it might be useful for 
franchisors to incorporate assessments of risk-taking into their selection policies. However, 
innovativeness (H1a) does not seem to be a “warning sign” of future opportunistic behavior 
under all circumstances. Given that ideas generated by individual franchisees are an increasingly 
important source to secure and develop a franchise system’s business model (in the case of 
McDonald’s, the invention of the BigMac and McCafé provide famous examples of innovations 
that originated from franchisee initiatives), there is, in general, less danger in offering franchise 
contracts to candidates who have a proven track record of innovative ideas. Selecting franchisees 
on the basis of their innovative capabilities, thus, might be generally useful, since such 
candidates might probably engage in advancing the franchise system as a whole without 
primarily seeking their self-interest and exhibiting free-riding tendencies. In franchise systems 
that follow a highly relational contracting approach, however, innovativeness may foster 
opportunism. Therefore, franchisors who intend to capitalize on their franchisee’s innovation 
capabilities should take care of having implemented suitable (formalized) follow-up processes to 
effectively handle franchisee initiatives at the franchise system level. In addition, if innovative 
franchisees are prevented from implementing their ideas in their own outlets by their franchisor, 
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this may similarly result in negative consequences such as reactance, less cooperation and 
opportunism. 
Considering the above, a combination of methods, including the assessment of objective 
information, such as prior business experience, as well as a candidate’s personality and 
motivations, including risk-taking and proactiveness (Jambulingam and Nevin 1999), may enable 
franchisors to identify the most suited future franchisees. For example, one characteristic that 
franchisors may be looking for is franchisees’ willingness to cooperate. This in combination with 
the entrepreneurial capacity of innovativeness could be a good foundation in order to implement 
a system strategy properly, augmented through the ideas and initiatives of the franchisee. 
Looking at the results related to H2c, it is suggested that in the case of a highly relational 
contract regime, franchisors should be especially aware of the danger of allowing franchisees 
with a high propensity to risk-taking to enter their system. 
It is also possible that individuals with stronger entrepreneurial motivations are more likely to 
exit the system sooner, as they become frustrated and dissatisfied with the boundaries set within 
franchise systems in general (Ping 1993). Evidence for this could be our finding that there is a 
negative link between the number of years of belonging to a franchise system and levels of 
opportunism. It is quite possible that franchisees who have, for example, a stronger 
entrepreneurial motivation and/or more substantial business experience will want to leverage 
their capacities more fully and in their own terms. For this reason they may strive for more 
autonomy and, if this is not being granted within the system, may decide to open their own 
venture.  
The key managerial implication for franchisors is to be aware of a “dark side” of 
entrepreneurial motivation: opportunistic behavior. It seems that franchisors cannot have one 
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without the other and thus have to find a balance between the two that best suits their system. It 
is necessary to understand where the optimal point lies that gives entrepreneurial and successful 
franchisees enough flexibility to exploit their capacities, and thereby keep them satisfied and in 
the system, whilst at the same time not running into the danger of creating opportunities for self-
interested actions that may damage the system.  
The identification of how this balance can be achieved is beyond the scope of our paper. 
However, there is one suggestion we would like to be considered: Related to the above 
discussion of franchisors selecting franchisees is the notion of franchisees’ self-selection. If the 
franchise system establishes through external communications, such as recruitment ads and 
promotional material, a realistic picture of what is expected of franchisees, it is more likely that 
candidates with a better fit with the system apply as potential franchisees. As a result, it might be 
easier for management to identify the right balance between flexibility and control, as the gap 
between franchisees’ and franchisors’ expectations in relation to behavioral norms may be 
smaller (Bretz and Judge 1998). 
There is also an alternative explanation for the negative link between the length of franchisees 
belonging to a system and levels of opportunism: With increased years of membership any 
contractual arrangements, formal or relational, may become better defined which decreases the 
propensity to behave opportunistically. Due to reasons of bounded rationality, franchisors cannot 
anticipate all problems that may arise throughout a partnership with a franchisee. Therefore, 
initial formal contracts may be suboptimal at the start. However, with the evolution of the 
system, franchisors’ increasing experience and knowledge of specific franchisees, new contracts 
for franchisees entering the system in the future may become more efficient over time (Cochet 
and Garg 2008). At the same time, in order to safeguard against opportunism and to ensure 
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performance over time of existing franchisees, franchisors can complement the content of 
contracts by specifying performance terms and control mechanisms post-hoc (Arruñada, 
Garicano and Vázquez 2001). Thus, formalization, which is regarded as a cost of contracting, 
may in fact be beneficial within a franchise system as it serves as a frame of reference to identify 
opportunistic behavior (Combs and Ketchen 1999). Alongside formalization also dimensions of 
relational contracting can develop over time, which may lead to stronger social barriers to 
opportunism. In cases where relational contracting does not establish appropriate safeguards, 
franchisors can still retain the right to complete existing formal contracts with additional terms. 
These arguments lend support for the notion that through learning and experience with 
specific franchisees, franchisors become better at efficient contracting, which in turn should 
positively impact on a system’s success. The managerial implication for franchisors is that it 
might be desirable to ensure that franchisees stay in the system for longer. Again, in order to 
achieve this, franchisors need to be aware of the trade-off they have to make between granting 
enough autonomy to keep franchisees, and setting enough boundaries in order to prevent 
opportunism. In order to achieve this successfully, franchisors may have to consider the 
experience and characteristics of individual franchisees as well as their position in the 
franchisee-lifecycle (Blut et al. 2011).  
Therefore, while it sounds plausible that franchisees need to be treated the same throughout 
the system in order to avoid internal quarrels, there is an argument to be made whether the 
management of franchisees can be really standardized. Given that these individuals have made 
over the years different experiences in the franchise system, have very different backgrounds, 
capacities, and aspirations, it is possible that an idiosyncratic approach to franchisee management 
might be more efficient (Birkeland 2002). This can also be achieved by the franchisors’ right to 
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complete existing individual contracts after franchisees have entered the system (Arruñada, 
Garicano and Vázquez 2001). 
An idiosyncratic approach would not only consider contracting methods, either formal or 
informal, but also include other practices such as the identification of individual training and 
development needs and opportunities. For example, highly driven and successful individuals 
could be more quickly given the option to develop entire regions through the ownership of 
multiple units. Through such initiatives, a stronger sense of achievement may be instilled, which 
in turn could lead to higher levels of satisfaction and longer loyalty to the system (Ping 1993). 
Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
To conclude, we suggest that, in general, managers should take into account that relational 
contracting might not be efficient in safeguarding against all risks of opportunism, in particular 
as the level of franchisees’ entrepreneurial motivation impacts on opportunistic tendencies. It is 
for these reasons that franchisors need to be aware of the dilemma they are facing in order to 
make an efficient ex-ante selection, as well as ex-post contracting decisions: Entrepreneurially 
minded franchisees who might be better at exploiting market opportunities for their units may at 
the same time behave more opportunistically, if given the chance. However, if they perceive the 
contractual framework as being too narrow, they may exit the system faster in order to start their 
own venture. As we observed a negative link between a franchisees’ time in the system and the 
tendency to act opportunistically, it seems a worthwhile pursuit to keep franchisees satisfied and 
in the system.  
Following this thought, there is great merit to explore further whether initial transaction costs 
caused by opportunism of entrepreneurially oriented franchisees outweigh the later gains through 
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gradually more efficient contracting and revenue streams through franchisees’ entrepreneurial 
motivation.  
Finally, we would like to point out that we only focused on the extent to which relational 
contracting may or may not safeguard against negative effects stemming from entrepreneurial 
characteristics. In order to gain a better insight into the advantages and disadvantages of different 
types of contracting in hybrid governance forms, studies should compare the effects of formal 
and relational contracting (Carson, Madhok, and Wu 2006). It may be particularly interesting to 
analyze how these two types of contracts develop and define the relationship between franchisors 
and franchisees over time (Cochet and Garg 2008). As in organizational reality the two types of 
contracting may complement each other (Poppo and Zenger 2002), there is merit to investigate in 
more depth how the two are interrelated and impact on franchisors’ transaction costs. 
In conclusion and despite the limitations of our study, our results point to an important 
dilemma franchisors need to be aware of: Entrepreneurially minded franchisees who might be 
better at exploiting market opportunities may also behave more opportunistically, if given the 
chance through a more relational contracting regime. At the same time, if they perceive the 
contractual framework as being too rigid, they may be less able to leverage their capabilities, 
become dissatisfied and exit the system. That is arguably the key challenge in franchising. 
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Table 1 
Sample Characteristics 
 
Sector 
 
Number of Franchisees 
in Sample 
Percentage 
 
DIY/Home Improvement 69 21.4 
Telecommunication/IT 55 17.1 
Computer Hard-/Software 51 15.9 
(Specialty) Food 24 7.5 
Home Electronics 17 5.4 
Insurance/Finance 62 19.3 
Handcraft/Small Trade 25 7.8 
Travel/Tourism 18 5.6 
 
Sum 
 
321 
 
100.0 
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Table 2 
Psychometric Properties 
 
 
Level 1 Measures 
 
Opportunism 1    
Innovativeness -.078 1   
Proactiveness .010 .088 1  
Risk Taking .618 -.101 -.006 1 
     Critical Ratio (CR) .978 .819 .833 .814 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) .867 .548 .626 .525 
 
 
 
Level 2 Measures 
 
Information Exchange 1 
  Flexibility .363** 1 
 Problem-Solving .176** .363** 1 
 
Critical Ratio (CR) .766 .868 .833 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) .526 .688 .555 
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Table 3 
HLM Results for Opportunism 
 
Predictor Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
t-ratio sig.-level 
Level 1 (dependent variable OPP)    
Innovativeness .032 .435  p  >  .1 
Proactiveness .180 2.449  p  <  .01 
Risk Taking .676 4.460 p  <  .001 
Franchisee Age  -.591*10
-3
 -4.917 p  <  .001 
    
Level 2 Intercept Effects    
Age of Franchise System .006 .0166 p  >  .1 
Number of Franchisees in the 
System 
.158 2.930 p  <  .01 
Average System Success  .218 .585 p  >  .1 
    
Level 2 Slope Effects    
Innovativeness    
Relational Contracting .241 1.882 p  <  .1 
 
Proactiveness 
   
Relational Contracting .027 .926 p  >  .1 
 
Risk Taking 
   
Relational Contracting .465 2.144 p  <  .05 
 
Franchisee Age 
   
Relational Contracting -.001 -.708 p  >  .1 
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Figure 1 
Conceptual Model 
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APPENDIX – QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS 
 
 
Entrepreneurial Characteristics (measures adapted from Jambulingam and Nevin 1999) 
 
A. Innovativeness  
(4 items, 5-point Likert Scale, “Strongly Disagree–Strongly Agree”) 
1. Franchisees should provide leadership in new product development 
2. The success of my franchise depends on constantly improving our products/services 
3. Franchisees should provide leadership in new operating procedure development. 
4. In my franchise, we emphasize the promotion of new innovative products/services. 
 
B. Proactiveness  
(3 items, 5-point Likert Scale, “Strongly Disagree–Strongly Agree”) 
1. I look for challenges at work. 
2. I think a lot about how to improve my chances for getting ahead. 
3. I get a thrill out of confronting challenges at work. 
 
C. Business Risk-Taking  
(4 items, 5-point Likert Scale, “Strongly Disagree—Strongly Agree”) 
1. My business strategy is characterized by a strong tendency to undertake high risk projects. 
2. A business should only take risks in areas that it knows well. (R) 
3. Research is important before making a risky decision. (R) 
4. I am a gambler—it is impossible to plan for the future. 
 
 
Franchisee Opportunism  
(7 items, 5-point Likert Scale, “Strongly Disagree–Strongly Agree”) 
 
1. I sometimes alter facts slightly in order to gain the cooperation of my franchisor 
2. I sometimes explicitly promise to do things requested by my franchisor without actually doing them later. 
3. I sometimes withhold information that would help my franchisor to run his business. 
4. I do not always share information in a timely manner with my franchisor. 
5. I sometimes make vague promises to my franchisor that I later ignore. 
6. I sometimes purposely withhold information that would put me in a bad light. 
7. I sometimes tell my franchisor what I think he wants to hear instead of telling him the truth. 
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APPENDIX – QUESTIONNAIRE ITEMS (cont.) 
 
 
Relational Contracting (Jambulingam and Nevin 1999) 
(10 items, 5-point Likert Scale, “Strongly Disagree–Strongly Agree”) 
 
A. Information Exchange 
1. Exchange of information in this relationship takes place frequently and informally and not only according to 
prespecified agreement. 
2. In our relationship, it is expected that any information that might help the other party will be provided to them. 
3. In this relationship, it is expected that parties will provide confidential information if it can help the other party. 
 
B. Flexibility 
1. Flexibility in response to requests for changes is a characteristics of our relationship. 
2. The ability to make adjustments in order to cope with changing circumstances is a characteristic of our 
relationship. 
3. My franchisor and I are open to modifying our agreements if unexpected events occur. 
 
C. Problem Solving 
1. When problems occur, I can easily find a mutually agreeable solution with my franchisor. 
2. My franchisor always makes an honest attempt to work out problems between us. 
3. My franchisor is very unwilling to settle disputes with me (R) 
4. Disagreements with my franchisor are usually solved by one-sided, “take it or leave it” solutions proposed by the 
franchisor (R) 
 
 
Success of the Franchise System 
(3 items, 5-point Likert Scale, “Strongly Disagree–Strongly Agree”) 
1. In all, the franchise system has been very successful in the past 3 years. 
2. Compared to our competition, we have been very successful. 
3. We have achieved our goals in terms of financial success. 
 
 
